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Life as a Making 
 
Perig Pitrou 
Paris Research University, CNRS 
Pépinière interdisciplinaire CNRS-PSL ‘Domestication et fabrication du vivant’ 
 
Life is a protean phenomenon, one that manifests itself at multiple levels and 
captures the attention of humans everywhere. It would be rash to claim that people 
across the globe perceive vital processes—such as growth, reproduction, 
senescence, and death—in the same way. However, it is clear that in the vast 
majority of instances, vital processes are obvious enough to retain human attention, 
so much so that we can confidently say that every human society develops 
explanatory systems in order to render these processes intelligible and, when 
possible, to act upon them. The major difficulty stems from the fact that the causes 
of these phenomena remain partially obscured from view. Notwithstanding the 
progress that has been made in medical imaging, it is as if life’s very action—its 
power to shape and to organize, to make beings interact with their environments, to 
cause them to regenerate or reproduce—remains hidden within the folds of matter, 
so that humans must deploy all their ingenuity to construct etiological explanations. 
Having observed this, it becomes clear that we ought to distinguish ‘living’ or 
‘being alive’ from ‘making live’ [faire vivre], and that we must not confuse the 
observable functional characteristics of living beings with the causes that produce 
them, whether internal or external, visible or invisible. 
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Surprisingly, although the distinction is obvious, anthropologists engaged in 
comparative studies on this subject rarely invoke it: the terms ‘life’, ‘alive’, and 
‘being alive’ often appear as synonyms (Pitrou 2014, 2015a). In order to avoid such 
semantic confusion and to define the realities to which these terms refer, it seems to 
me more accurate to choose the term ‘life’ to designate the set of causes that makes 
it such that beings are considered ‘living beings’ or ‘alive’. Far from suggesting that 
these concepts refer to universal realities, I propose using them as provisional 
demarcations, as invitations to take a new look at the diverse array of conceptions 
of life and the living that prevail in human societies—much in the same way that 
the anthropologist of nature Philippe Descola (2013) sought to depict the 
multiplicity of conceptions of ‘nature’. 
I became aware of the importance of these issues during two and a half 
years of ethnographic fieldwork over the period of 2005 to 2015, among the Mixe, 
an Amerindian people living in peasant village communities located in the Sierra 
Norte of Oaxaca, Mexico (Pitrou 2016a). My exploration of animal sacrifices 
performed by the Mixe in agricultural, therapeutic, and political contexts allowed 
me to ascertain that prayers uttered in the vernacular language are often addressed 
to a non-human entity known as ‘The One Who Makes Being Alive’ as well as to 
associated entities such as the Rain, the Wind, and the Earth. Starting off from the 
postulate that the actions imputed to this entity trace the contours of what I call ‘a 
theory of life’, I proposed interpreting life as a ‘process of making’: that is, as a set 
of actions performed by this non-human agent to encourage vital processes in 
agricultural rites (Pitrou 2014) or birth rites (Pitrou 2017). Depending on the 
situation, this agent may be called upon to ‘distribute’ the rain so that corn will 
grow, or to ‘bake’ the body of a newborn child, just like a potter firing his pieces. In 
this context, making includes various kinds of technical activity combined into 
sequences or a set of sequences. For example, there may be techniques of the body 
(a doing), cognitive techniques of measurement, techniques involving the use of 
tools, techniques of shaping or composition, and so on. At the same time, 
envisioning life as a making means that the specificity of this agency can be 
approached through the question of form, matter, measure, movement, composition, 
etc. A comparative study with Amazonia and Oceania (Pitrou 2016b; Pitrou, 
Coupaye & Provost 2016) has convinced me, furthermore, that this way of viewing 
matter is applicable not only to the Mixe. An approach inspired by pragmatics, one 
that focuses on the categories of action and agency thought to encourage vital 
processes, is useful for understanding the plurality of conceptions of life found 
across the planet. 
Adopting this point of view allows us to avoid treating life abstractly, like 
some sort of uniform flow circulating between bodies. Although the dynamics 
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specific to such circulation should be studied, I argue that to understand life it is 
necessary to reproduce what I call ‘agentive configurations’ (Pitrou 2015a, 2017). 
With this notion, I suggest that instead of taking ‘life’ in a very general way, as if 
humans could have an unmediated connection with this phenomenon, it is more 
relevant to consider their knowledge of life as arising from a multiplicity of 
relations and interactions that they establish with living beings. From this point of 
view, I have suggested, then, to develop an approach able to describe the many vital 
processes at work in a given context, as well as the diversity of actions humans take 
to influence—or try to influence—these processes. My fieldwork also led me to 
understand that the actions of ‘The One Who Makes Being Alive’ should be 
analyzed in connection with the actions the Mixe take to influence his agency, in 
particular through what I call a ‘regime of co-activity’. For example, by distributing 
materials on a miniature ceremonial deposit they attempt to ritually connect the 
action of distributing corn throughout a field with the action of distributing the rain 
thought to cause growth (Pitrou 2014, 2016a). On the basis of this theoretical 
construction, which translates emic concepts into etic ones, I suggest that it is 
instructive to describe the modes of coordination between life (that is, the causes, 
internal or external, personified or not, that make living beings alive) and the 
actions humans take to influence these processes. In my conclusion, I explain that 
we must also take into account the actions that other living beings may perform on 
humans. My argument here is that in order to explore ‘agentive configurations’ it is 
necessary to analyze the modalities of technical actions taken within them. It is my 
contention that the diverse array of such technical activities can be treated both as 
models of intelligibility that allow humans to imagine functions that they cannot 
observe and as the concrete modalities of action humans use to increase and refine 
their power over the living.  
In an excellent doctoral dissertation entitled ‘Crafting life: A sensory 
explanatory of fabricated life’ (2010)—the basis for the book Synthetic: How life 
got made (2017)—Sophia Roosth also defends the idea that 21st-century 
conceptualizations of the living should be analyzed through studies of various 
activities ‘of making’, in particular in the domain of synthetic biology or ‘DIY 
biology’. I am in complete agreement with the two ideas at the basis of Roosth’s 
argument. First, as Stefan Helmreich has been brilliantly showing for the last 
twenty years, the concept of life, which has been in crisis, is being completely 
reshaped—and not only in scientific circles. Second, it is crucial to connect human 
conceptions of the living with actual practices—to treat ‘knowing as making and 
making as knowing’, to quote the title of one of Evelyn Fox Keller’s articles (2009). 
However, my goal is different from Roosth’s, first of all because my analysis goes 
beyond the field of science and technology studies. I do not mean to deny the 
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importance that the reconfiguration of the living within the sciences has had over 
the past several decades and the epistemological problems it raises. However, my 
focus is on exploring how, well before the development of biotechnologies, humans 
used technical activity to conceptualize the agency specific to life. This is why the 
anthropology of life I am developing seeks to build a comparative framework that 
leaves room for ethnographic data gathered in non-Western traditional societies. 
The epistemological reflection that anthropology has undertaken of the notion of 
life seems to follow a path similar to the critical enterprise that tackled the notion of 
nature from two centers: science and technology studies (Franklin 1997; Latour 
1993; Mol 2002) and the ethnology of non-Western societies (Descola 2013; Ingold 
2000; Strathern 1992; Viveiros de Castro 2012). A good example of this dynamic 
can be found in Gílsi Pálsson’s Nature, culture and society: anthropological 
perspectives on life (2015). Now, it seems to me that the notion of ‘agentive 
configurations’ provides us with a consistent heuristic tool for studying the 
conceptions of life that dominate in very different societies (modern/non-modern; 
Western/non-Western). In order to prove the analytic benefit of this pragmatics-
inspired approach, we must go into detail and identify the intellectual and material 
techniques that allow humans to maintain an always-mediated relationship with 
vital processes. 
Thus, my intention is not so much to consider actions such as crafting, 
making, or doing as categories that would encompass a set of dissimilar practices 
(for example, synthetic biology and crocheting with coral and wool yarn (Roosth 
2013)). To the contrary, it seems richer to start from the principle that making refers 
to a plurality of activities, each one having its own specific traits and shedding light 
on different aspects of life. The goal of this article is to offer a first look at this 
diversity by recalling that the notion of technique, which is quite vast, refers to a set 
of practices that are highly diverse and sometimes complementary but never 
reducible to one another. Techniques of the body, cognitive techniques, craftwork, 
construction, manufacturing, production, engineering, technology, artistic 
techniques, and bricolage are all activities that allow humans to intervene in the 
world, sometimes in order to modify their relations to other living beings using 
specific modalities. In order to systematically organize—synchronically and 
diachronically—the agentive configurations that correspond to these techniques, an 
in-depth investigation is indispensable to my anthropological project and to the goal 
of comparing variations in conceptions of life across time and space. The brief 
inventory provided in this article is meant to be a preliminary study for a larger 
project; it aims to sketch out some initial directions that a comparative study might 
take. 
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Life as Artcraft: Creating, Shaping, and Building 
Since antiquity, the distinction between technè and phusis has provided a heuristic 
model for understanding the specificity of the activities that take place within 
natural beings, the mechanisms of which are difficult to observe (Canguilhem 1965 
[1952]). For instance, the analogy between living beings and artifacts makes it 
possible to represent the action of growth by comparing it to that of the artisan who 
shapes objects by performing an external action, just as nature appears to do from 
inside living beings. Of course, this distinction should not be treated as a rigid 
dichotomy: on the one hand, according to Aristotle, at a certain level, the artisan’s 
activity is considered to be the extension of a natural movement; on the other hand, 
often it is the imbrication of vital processes and technical processes that can teach 
us the most (Pitrou, Coupaye & Provost 2016). However, this analogy is a good 
starting point for understanding the sense in which technical activity—here, 
craftwork—helps humans render life intelligible. Without going so far as to claim 
that technical activity is fully exoteric, we may say that it belongs to a field of 
practice in which humans, because of the driving role they play in it, have more 
knowledge, when compared with their grasp of the domain of vital processes. This 
is why many creation myths turn to metaphors involving techniques to illustrate 
how living beings were created as well as to explain the functional characteristics 
they display.  
Among the Mixe, a myth explains how ‘The One Whose Activity is to Have 
Ideas’ (täätyunpï) created the beings of the world:  
 
1. täätyunpï  ‘The One Whose Activity is to Have Ideas’ 
2. jaayïp yï  in the beginning 
3. tsyoo’ntä’äky tsoo’ntä’äkyïp he begins [to invent/to create] 
4. et näxwii’nyït meet the Expanse, the Surface of the earth 
5. yï täätyunpï ‘The One Whose Activity is to Have Ideas’ 
6. mäjï na’apï mäjï kojpï just as the potter, the weaver 
7. na’apï ëë’pyï […] makes pottery, bends [the fibers to weave 
them] […] 
8. nayïtë’n in the same way 
9. tyanïpïktääjkïp he deposits the elements (= he builds the 
earth) 
10. täätyunpï ‘The One Whose Activity is to Have Ideas’ 
11. tyanïwejtsïp  he orders 
12. sutsooj ja tyïk’ëyït how to build 
13. ja tsïnaapyïtï ja jää’tyï the seated, the people (= the humans) 
14. pën jatë’n tsïnaatyïp who are thus seated (= who exist) 
15. ja jïyujktï ja ujtstï the animals, the plants 
16. tuki’yï tum yë’ ntejïnt all this truly, it is said, 
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17. yïktamïjää’wïp  it is believed that 
18. tnïkëjxp’aty he carries it (= that the Creator keeps these 
beings in existence) 
19. yë’ts tyïkëë’yïp  those he causes to be built 
20. ja ujts ja kipy ja tsääj the plants, the trees, the stones 
 
 The diversity of actions imputed to this agent offers a first glimpse of the 
complexity of the theory of life contained within the myth. From a material point of 
view, his activity is understood through analogies with pottery that shapes beings, 
and the manipulation of plant fibers in basket-making or house-building that creates 
a framework. Life thus appears as the activity of composing heterogeneous 
elements that are manipulated in order to give a being its form and structure, as 
attested by the presence of a third verb used to refer to the intervention of the 
demiurge as a ‘construction’. This construction is described literally as a 
‘depositing’ (pïktä’äky), a term that refers to the internal organization of an 
organism as well as the organization of relationships between beings, such as, for 
example, the hierarchy that dictates which living beings are eaten by others. In 
another part of the myth, there is also reference to the breath that animates beings 
once they have been shaped, built, and organized. It is said that ‘The One Who 
Makes Being Alive’ gives vitality (yë’ yïkjujykypyëjkp). We can note immediately 
that the conceptualization of life passes through a set of representations of the 
plurality of causes, irreducible to one another, which are at the origin of phenomena 
observable among living beings. Beyond the question of whether a being is animate 
or not—a question that sometimes monopolizes the attention of anthropologists—
the technical or technicist analogy offers access to a set of relations that occur at the 
level of organisms as well as within environments. 
In order to fully understand the lessons contained in these types of analogy, 
we must note that they imply the idea of process, which thus rules out reducing 
technical activity to an isolated gesture. To the contrary, origin stories that describe 
how objects are made—in our case, living beings—more or less explicitly depict 
what Pierre Lemonnier calls ‘mythical operational chains’ (2004), that is, series of 
heterogeneous actions performed by a plurality of agents who coordinate their 
engagement with material. For example, by comparing the morphogenetic process 
to pottery-making, the reference is not solely to an action of modeling. Such action 
can occur only as part of a longer sequence of distinct operations that involves 
techniques of the body as well as cognitive techniques (counting, predicting, and so 
on) converging to construct a being: cutting wood, lighting a fire, building an oven, 
gathering earth. 
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This emphasis on synchronic and diachronic co-ordination and on 
heterogeneous actions accounts for the fact that the role I attribute to techniques in 
explaining vital mechanisms differs from the one recognized by Tim Ingold (Pitrou, 
Coupaye & Provost 2016). Ingold’s phenomenological approach, from The 
perception of the environment (2000) to Making (2013) by way of Being alive 
(2011), leads him to discern a manifestation of life in technical acts. The 
resemblances between certain artifacts and living forms—for example, the spiral 
patterns visible on baskets and on the shells of mollusks—attest, according to 
Ingold, to a continuity between the living body of the artisan, which moves to its 
own rhythm, and the body of the material on which he acts—in the same way that a 
shell preserves within itself the traces of an élan vital. Making and growing 
(Hallam & Ingold 2014) offers many examples of this dynamic, in which materials, 
far from being shapeless substances shaped by human action, are treated as milieus 
with which the body interacts, giving birth to the material forms of objects and to 
artisans’ know-how. 
This approach naturalizes the technical act and takes it as a manifestation of 
life understood as a movement. Though quite interesting and rather convincing, it 
cannot claim to sum up, by itself, all the relationships that exist between life and 
technique (for a detailed critique, see Pitrou 2014). While it is true that in certain 
sequences it is enough to underscore the continuities and isomorphisms between 
morphogenesis and technical acts, the complexity of vital phenomena—and thus, of 
the technical configurations that can represent them—is clearly much greater. 
Consequently, if technical activity helps humans better understand life, it is only by 
taking into account a set of actions, the organized combination of which can bring a 
being—whether living or artifactual—into existence. Ingold is certainly right to 
criticize a hylomorphism that interpreted technical activity as merely giving form to 
inert matter on the basis of mental representations. However, his criticism is 
weakened by his rejection of the heuristic value of the concept of an operational 
sequence (chaîne opératoire), a descriptive tool that is in fact particularly well 
suited to understanding the essential heterogeneity of technical activity and its 
capacity to combine agents, operations, and materials in order to make beings 
(Latour 2012; Lemonnier 2012). 
The work of Ludovic Coupaye (2013) on the Abelam of Papua New Guinea 
demonstrates the significance of studying yams as ‘growing artifacts’, that is, as 
living beings whose appearance and properties depend on a multiplicity of actions 
performed by human and non-human agents who co-ordinate their interventions in 
making these plants grow. As is the case with made objects, the many different 
characteristics of living beings cannot be explained in terms of a single uniform 
movement imprinting matter, nor can the process of creation be adequately grasped 
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through the opposition between form and matter—if for no other reason than that 
principles of measurement must also be taken into account. For example, in pottery, 
the act of shaping must be accompanied by operations through which amounts of 
materials are apportioned and assembled and cooking time is calculated. Instead of 
postulating a movement or rhythm of the world that encompasses all beings and 
thus dissolves the distinction between the living and the non-living it seems more 
productive to approach technique and life through an analytic framework that 
acknowledges the diversity of phenomena these activities involve: energy, 
movement, matter, measurement, processes of decomposition and re-composition—
to mention only a few examples.  
In so doing, I am not seeking to defend a philosophical position on what life 
is. My goal, rather, is to examine how conceptions of life orient concrete practices. 
The technicist metaphor does not only provide plausible scenarios to explain the 
apparition of phenomena linked to life: it is also very actively applied to act on 
living beings. Thus, the connection between conceptions of life and technical 
activities works in both ways. If vital processes can be treated as analogous to 
technical processes, in return, technical processes are mobilized in order to act on 
living beings. As Arthur M. Hocart suggests in The life-giving myth (1952), myths 
should be interpreted as explanatory systems. Many of them contain a ‘science of 
life’, which is put into practice in rites—a way of acting upon vital processes, by 
acting either directly on living beings (human, animal, or plant), or indirectly, by 
soliciting the participation of entities that are thought to ‘make live’ or ‘make being 
alive’. For example, among the Mixe, the ‘Creator’s’ activity is not limited to 
creating the world and the Creator is expected to participate in the birth of each 
child. Ritual baths are given to newborns so that they will become ‘strong, hard’, 
and so, in a sense, that they will be ‘cooked’ by heat. Prayers are addressed to the 
Creator so that he will guide the shaping of the infant’s body (Pitrou 2017). Here, 
we see that if life is understood in terms of the activity of pottery-making, 
symmetrically, the living person is understood as a being who, just like an artifact, 
has to be shaped and built. 
Beyond the Mesoamerican world, other examples of this circularity between 
conceptions and practices can be found in the lowlands of South America, where 
procedures for constructing and giving form to persons beginning with their birth 
resemble the operational sequence used to make artifacts (Fortis 2014; Lagrou 
2007; Pitrou 2016b, 2017; Praet 2013; Santos-Granero 2009). Santos-Granero’s 
‘constructional approach’, which is based on his ethnographic work among the 
Yanesha of the Peruvian Amazon, demonstrates the links between myths and rites 
in this process of making personhood. Just as it is thought that demiurges created 
the beings of the world with a mixture of earth and bodily substances, Yanesha 
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families believe that they must create their children generation after generation. In 
this process, the agency of plants, artifacts, animal elements (such as feathers and 
bones), and the bodily substances of the parents are carefully identified—making it 
possible to grasp the composite nature of subjectivities among the Yanesha. Santos-
Granero identifies two principal modes by which living beings incorporate outside 
elements: ‘embodiment, which entails the incorporation through objectivation of 
external substances and subjectivities, and ensoulment, which involves the 
incorporation through subjectivation of external artifacts and bodily substances’ 
(2012: 198). 
On the other side of the Pacific, in China, the practices described in Ten 
thousand things: nurturing life in contemporary Beijing (Farquhar & Zhang 2012) 
demonstrate that, as in the sense of Foucauldian ‘practices of the self’, persons are 
not merely objects formed by techniques: they build and shape themselves. 
According to Qicheng Zhang, ‘“The Chinese ancients” […] saw their lives as 
nothing if not susceptible to active forming and crafting’ (13). In order to study this 
‘tradition of self-cultivation’ (zixiu), which continues today, the authors study 
residents of Beijing who “actively seek to form and craft—to nurture (yang)—their 
lives’ (13). Although this conception leads to an abstract elaboration within the 
Chinese philosophical view, it is above all through techniques—bodily, culinary, 
artistic, and so on—that they can be illustrated. Indeed, any action made with and 
on the body may provide information about which dynamic energies, associated 
with qi, are mobilized and channeled. 
Once we begin to see technical activity as something more than a 
convenient metaphor for thinking about life, and understand it instead as an activity 
that combines technical and vital processes, we open the way to inquiries that take 
into account the relational dimension of life and the agency specific to the living. In 
order to further explore this dimension, I will now turn to views of life as a 
production. 
Processes of Production 
From the moment humans attempt to exert control over vital processes, including 
those that occur within their own bodies, they discover that their power over the 
living is never total. To the contrary, they must constantly adapt their actions 
depending on mechanisms that produce their own effects, something Alfred Gell 
explains nicely when he writes that ‘all living things are agents with respect to 
themselves in that their growth and form may be attributed to their own agency’ 
(1998: 41). A gardener may change the quantity of water he uses to grow his plants, 
but the process of growth remains a phenomenon that occurs without his 
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participation. Contraception increases control over reproductive cycles, while 
medically-assisted procreation resolves problems linked to infertility. However, the 
process of reproduction itself, in which the encounter between spermatozoids and 
ovocytes initiates embryogenesis, remains an event that humans can encourage, but 
not entirely control. We could add more examples by looking at how 
biotechnologies, archaic as well as contemporary, always mark the boundaries of a 
zone of uncertainty and alterity specific to life, a space within which humans can 
act only indirectly. 
In a seminal paper (1962), André-Georges Haudricourt outlined a grammar 
of actions that could be used to classify the wide variety of ways humans treat 
animals and plants, in particular to correlate it with the way humans are treated in 
sociopolitical organizations (see also Descola 2013; Ferret 2012). Whereas yam 
cultivation in Oceania is based on ‘indirect negative action’, taken not on the 
domesticated being but rather on the milieu that surrounds it, pastoral activity in the 
Mediterranean basin mobilizes ‘direct positive action’, which requires constant 
attention to the herd. At a deeper level, it seems to me that this range of actions 
ultimately depends on the vital processes that humans observe among living beings, 
and from whose products they attempt to benefit. In a little-known text fundamental 
for approaching the question of the imbrication of vital and technical processes, 
François Sigaut (1980) remarks that ‘humans use many different plant species, but 
each one in just a few ways, whereas they only use a few animal species, but each 
one in many ways’. He proposes an analytic table focusing on three animals—dogs, 
pigs, and roosters/hens—to indicate the variety of products humans derive from 
these beings. His goal is methodological above all: to emphasize through these 
examples the diversity of biomaterials and animal behaviors that humans in 
different societies enlist for their own enterprises. In order to study this type of 
configuration, Sigaut proposes ‘taking the point of view of the providing animal. 
The things the animal provides have been named “products”, to indicate that from 
the moment they are collected, they enter into an operational sequence (a product, 
in other words, is a thing that has economic significance)’ (1980: 21, emphasis 
original). 
We have seen that life may be understood as a process of shaping and 
building in which a living being is bit by bit given its specific characteristics. With 
the notion of the providing animal, the emphasis is on the capacity of each living 
being to supply energy or to carry out activities of transformation on its own. In 
deciding to consider ‘life as a making’, it is certainly not sufficient to conceive of 
the creation of living beings as the result of technical activity. We must be attentive 
to a sort of delegation of agency, whereby living beings are themselves makers, or 
rather, producers. In describing his concept of ‘product’, Sigaut specifies that: 
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it is sometimes necessary to distinguish several products belonging to the 
same anatomic category on the basis of the uses they are intended to serve 
[…] [F]at, for example, may be gathered differently depending on whether it is 
to be used for food, lighting, or other uses (lubricating cart axels, soaking 
metal, etc.). The ‘same’ thing can give birth to several different ‘products’. 
(1980: 24, emphasis added) 
Parallel to the plasticity of forms, living beings are characterized by the 
diversity of elements that comprise them and by the potentiality contained in these 
elements. Independently of the fact that life as such implies a process of material 
diversification—for the same being can produce bones, blood, etc.—human 
inventiveness is such that the ways these products are used vary widely across 
different societies. Thus, Sigaut’s chart provides a useful analytic tool for 
comparison. It would be interesting to expand on this tool to integrate more life 
forms, including micro-organisms. 
A further advantage of using the concept of product is that it connects the 
vital processes that produce elements such as fat, muscle, hair, blood, etc. in living 
beings with the technical and economic processes that insert these material 
elements—which Marx called ‘lines of production’—into systems of exchange, 
giving them a value that in turn depends on the ‘process of capital’. We can then 
articulate three types of processes—vital, technical, and economic—in order to 
understand how localized agentive configurations, in which various human and 
non-human agents act, are connected to larger dynamics tying life to work and to 
capital. In order to understand the imbrications of these multi-tiered processes, we 
must go beyond a mere inventory of the array of products living beings can provide, 
and study the multiplicity of interactions that take place between life forms in a 
given environment. In The life of cheese (2013), Heather Paxson does just that, 
developing the concept of ‘ecologies of production’ in order to study the 
intertwined agencies involved in cheese production. She writes that ‘artisanal 
cheese may be made largely by hand, but humans do not make it alone: ruminant 
animals, herding and guard dogs, and bacteria, yeast, and molds also contribute’. 
She proposes treating such configurations as ‘working landscapes’, noting that: 
In a working landscape, grazing livestock are seen to ‘work’ with human 
agents to produce value […] [P]roducers direct attention to how various forms 
of labor and life—from grazing animals to metabolizing microorganisms to 
skilled humans—come together on a farm to generate the particular qualities 
of a cheese […] The biological activity of sheep and microorganisms, no less 
than the industry of humans, can be narrated as producing commodity value 
because the story taps into wider cultural values regarding the virtue of hard 
work. (2013: 32–3) 
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Like Sigaut, Paxson discusses the agencies of various living beings within a 
common framework, while showing how bioproducts are themselves integrated into 
processes of production. Her analysis demonstrates that the activity of the living 
can be understood through the category of work, as the activity of living beings is 
integrated into a social division of labor and a system of exchanges, ultimately 
contributing to the creation of capital: ‘Milk is also rhetorically produced as good 
when biological processes of animal gestation, birthing, eating, rumination, 
digestion, and lactation are narrated as labor, since labor (in this theory) is what 
produces value’ (Paxson 2013: 39–40, emphasis original). Instead of Sigaut’s two-
column table (living being/product), the concept of ‘ecologies of production’ refers 
to a dynamic analytic model that can account for the complex, layered connections 
between vital processes and the systems that organize work and capital: 
By situating artisan cheesemaking within ecologies of production I mean to 
call attention to the multiple agencies that contribute to agricultural enterprise, 
while also emphasizing that the dynamic capacities of a farm are harnessed 
through a capitalist mode of production to generate food for commercial 
trading as well as for eating. (Paxson 2013: 32) 
To understand local ‘ecologies of production’ from a global perspective, Paxson 
has created the concept of ‘microbiopolitics’. Microbiopolitics refers to the 
objective and transverse norms and measures that political authorities establish to 
standardize the production of micro-organisms, such as rules for cheese 
pasteurization or mandates on the legal length of fermentation. 
Such consideration of the multi-scale processes of inter-species 
collaborations also leads to taking into account the way agentive configurations 
evolve. Indeed, changes in the relations among living beings also often lead to 
transformations of organisms, particularly when they are the result of human 
projects. In his introduction to the work Industrializing organisms (Schrepfer & 
Scranton 2004), Edmund Russell explains that rather than opposing the 
development of mechanical techniques to the use of animals, we can think of 
‘industrialisation [as] a biological as well as a mechanical process. Machines, plants, 
and animals coexisted, industrialization needed living organisms to succeed’. He 
outlines an ‘evolutionary history’ that brings data from biology and history into 
dialogue with one another. Furthermore, he recommends studying how, on account 
of the plasticity of organisms, ‘people have shaped [them] to serve human ends’ 
(Russell 2004: 2). Humans impact the evolution of species—that is, dynamics such 
as variation, selection, or heritage—by using old methods (introducing a population 
to a new environment, selecting progenitors, etc.) or very modern ones (gene 
insertion). Russell calls for a history of techniques that does not focus only on 
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‘human–machine’ interactions but also on ‘human–machine–nature interactions’ 
(4). 
In her piece in Making and growing (Hallam & Ingold 2014), historian 
Jacqueline Field provides a wonderful demonstration of the importance of taking 
this sort of multi-factor approach in her exploration of silk production, which 
consists of an intertwining of various vital processes, themselves part of various 
technical processes.1 In hybrid communities, where women carry ‘silkworm eggs’ 
in their clothing, ‘people, plants and insects are intimately interconnected in the 
labor-intensive silk production process’ (Field 2014: 27). This division of labor is 
anything but static, and it evolves over time—or rather, it causes organisms to 
evolve, since the silkworms, which can be described as living artifacts, over the 
course of generations become unable to survive without human care. The author 
emphasizes, moreover, that this guided evolution, which at the beginning used 
artisanal techniques, nowadays uses new technologies: ‘Transgenic breeding and 
other manipulations have made new kinds of silkworms. Through bioengineering 
practices, making becomes an integral aspect of growing’ (Field 2014: 40). There 
are two things to note here. First, investigations into the diversity of techniques 
used to act upon the living must remember that innovations do not necessarily 
transform agentive configurations. Instead, they may make it possible to expand on 
already old practices by amplifying their effects. Second, we must not let examples 
of guided evolution make us think that humans have always intervened in vital 
processes as masters and possessors of nature. As Russell reminds us, evolutionary 
history must take into account evolutions that take place in environments 
independently of human intentions—a point I will return to in my conclusion. 
The Biomedical Mode of Reproduction (Thompson) 
By looking at ecologies of production alongside the evolution of organisms, we 
arrive at an approach that, using a matrix defined by the conceptual pairs 
production/reproduction and work/capital, is well suited to thinking about 
biotechnologies. Within feminist critique in particular, biotechnologies have begun 
to reconsider the production/reproduction distinction established by the Marxist 
tradition, foregrounding the importance of reproduction in the capitalist process. 
The ‘molecularization of life’ (Rose 2006), which increased with the development 
of new biotechnologies at the end of the twentieth century (e.g., genomics, 
regenerative medicine, grafting) means that it is no longer enough to pay attention 
																																								 																				
1	‘One	 is	 the	 agricultural	 activity	of	 growing	mulberry,	 raising	 silkworms	and	 reeling	 silk	 filament	
that	 is	marketed	as	raw	silk	 […]	The	other	 involves	the	use	of	 raw	silk	and	the	activity	of	making	
useable	threads	and	weaving	textiles’	(Field	2014:	28).	
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to how products that come from living beings are used. We must also take into 
account the potential of these products, especially in reproduction (Franklin & Lock 
2003: 8).2 The exploitation of these products in agriculture and livestock takes on a 
different meaning as elements of human bodies are used for increasingly diverse 
purposes. Not only are organs removed and placed in other organisms; in this 
‘strange harvest’ (Sharp 2006), the body is treated as an assemblage of pieces, some 
of which can be replaced, including by non-human elements (xenograft) or artifacts 
(prosthesis). The sharp increase in the amount of living tissues that humans are now 
able to extract, preserve, grow, and reintroduce into new beings creates a new 
conception of vital processes. Conservation no longer merely suspends the 
thanatogenic process, creating a state of ‘suspended death’ (Kowal & Radin 2015). 
Technological processes also encourage the reproductive potential of selected 
living fragments, whether human embryos or cells (Cooper 2008: 127).3 
Quite logically, it is in the domain of medically assisted reproduction that 
this paradigm change is most clearly observed. In Making parents (2005), Charis 
Thompson defends the idea that the manipulation of reproductive elements 
(spermatozoids and oocytes) has led to the creation of a ‘biomedical mode of 
reproduction’ that, without replacing the capitalist ‘mode of production’, generates 
another source of capital. In order to study the changes brought about by ‘assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART)’, Thompson creates the concept of ‘ontological 
choreography’, 4  which, like Paxson’s ‘ecologies of production’, describes the 
modalities by which human activities are co-ordinated with other agencies—in this 
																																								 																				
2	S.	Franklin	and	M.	Lock	describe	the	innovation	that	led	to	the	emergence	of	biocapital	as	follows:	
it	is	‘driven	by	a	form	of	extraction	that	involves	isolating	and	mobilizing	the	primary	reproductive	
agency	of	specific	body	parts,	particularly	cells,	in	a	manner	not	dissimilar	to	that	by	which,	as	Marx	
described	it,	soil	plays	the	“principal”	role	in	agriculture’	(2003:	8).	
3	Melinda	 Cooper	 summarizes	 the	 situation	 as	 follows:	 ‘This	 is	 where	 regenerative	 medicine	 is	
strikingly	 different.	 If	 organ	 transplant	 medicine	 needs	 to	maintain	 life	 in	 a	 state	 of	 suspended	
animation,	regenerative	medicine,	it	might	be	argued,	is	more	interested	in	capturing	life	in	a	state	
of	perpetual	self-transformation.	Life,	as	mobilized	by	regenerative	medicine,	 is	always	 in	surplus	
of	itself.	This	is	not	to	argue,	of	course,	that	regenerative	medicine	dispenses	with	the	methods	of	
tissue	 and	 organ	 preservation—such	 methods	 are	 essential	 once	 a	 tissue	 construct	 has	 been	
created—but	 what	 it	 works	 with	 is	 the	 body's	 capacity	 to	 elude	 such	 moments	 of	 suspended	
animation	and	frozen	form’	(2008:	127).	
4	‘The	term	ontological	choreography	refers	to	the	dynamic	coordination	of	the	technical,	scientific,	
kinship,	gender,	emotional,	legal,	political,	and	financial	aspects	of	ART	clinics.	What	might	appear	
to	be	an	undifferentiated	hybrid	mess	is	actually	a	deftly	balanced	coming	together	of	things	that	
are	generally	considered	parts	of	different	ontological	orders	(part	of	nature,	part	of	the	self,	part	
of	society).	These	elements	have	to	be	coordinated	in	highly	staged	ways	so	as	to	get	on	with	the	
task	at	hand:	producing	parents,	 children,	 and	everything	 that	 is	needed	 for	 their	 recognition	as	
such’	(Thompson	2005:	8).	
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case, the agency of reproductive materials.5 We discover that, just as in Amazonian 
societies, the human person can be understood as a hybrid, the result of a cross 
between technical processes and vital processes. It is especially remarkable that in 
these configurations, living fragments are no longer merely products arriving at the 
end of a living chain of production and inserted into economic and technical 
processes. Instead, because of their ability to reproduce and to give birth to new 
beings, they themselves open new cycles. Thus, another economic system emerges, 
one that connects work and capital in an entirely new way. Thompson concludes 
that ‘the biomedical mode of reproduction that I trace through the human embryo 
has its own characteristic systems of exchange and value, notions of the life course, 
epistemic norms, hegemonic political forms, security, and hierarchies and 
definitions of commodities and personhood’ (2005: 248). 
Along similar lines, in a paper published in 2009, Pálsson, starting from a 
synthesis of works dedicated to the social consequences of biotechnologies, 
proposes the expression ‘biosocial relations of production’ (a phrase also used in 
the title of the paper) to define the new configurations to which these technologies 
give rise. He writes that: ‘Life itself is increasingly modified and reproduced 
through artificial means, including cloning, genetic engineering, and synthetic 
biology’ (2009: 293). As a result, the Marxian approach to the economy can be 
extended to ‘biosocial relations of production’, highlighting the ‘hierarchies and 
materialities of the political economy of the fragmented, manufactured body’ 
(2009: 296). 
In The pasteurization of France (1993), and in particular in his essay 
‘Irreductions’ (part II), which follows that text, Bruno Latour mobilizes the notions 
of actant, agency, and network to achieve a non-anthropocentric description of the 
real and to grasp the simultaneously natural and social dimension of microbes. 
Despite the undeniable heuristic advantages of the actor-network theory, the 
problem is that it tends to ‘flatten’ the world. The risk is that the notion of agency 
will be used as an all-encompassing category, without taking into account the 
specificity of vital processes. In my opinion, it is more promising to retain what is 
specific about the agencies of life and the living, and thus to highlight the specific 
capacities for (re)production these agencies add to a network. 6  This is why 
																																								 																				
5	‘Ontological	choreography	coordinates	two	different	‘‘things’’	that	are	especially	salient	in	ARTs—
the	grafting	of	parts	and	the	calibrating	of	time.	An	important	element	of	ARTs	is	the	grafting	of	the	
properties	and	processes	that	make	up	a	thing	onto	the	properties	and	processes	of	another	thing.	
Thus,	when	body	parts	and	instruments	are	mixed	up	to	make	a	woman	pregnant,	the	properties	
and	processes	of	the	instruments	are	annexed	to	the	body	parts	in	a	way	that	makes	a	pregnancy	
become	possible’	(Thompson	2005:	9).	On	this	issue,	see	also	Mol’s	‘forms	of	coordination’	in	The	
body	multiple	(2002).	
6	But	see	Latour’s	analysis	of	the	concept	of	lineage	in	Latour	(2012).	
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Pálsson’s proposition seems perfect for deepening the Latourian model. As Pálsson 
writes, ‘The bio-graphies of fragmented bodies, in the literal sense, their life-
courses, unfold through the agency of a series of actors and actants, in the Latourian 
sense, who both constitute and are constituted by particular biosocial relations of 
production’ (2009: 302, emphasis original). 
Thus, the goal becomes tracing the singularity of the organization of 
technical and vital processes in a universe where living fragments seem to be 
increasingly autonomous and break away from organisms to themselves become 
(re)producers. It is not just the preservation of elements such as blood or organs 
which is at stake, but the potentiality of bioproducts to produce new products and, 
consequently, new sources of wealth. In this context, the potential of biological 
development implies also economic potentialities. Independently of ART, cell 
culture and the re-programming of stem cells contribute to reshaping how human 
actions are co-ordinated with the agencies of these fragments. In Life as a surplus 
(2008), Melinda Cooper summarizes the situation nicely:  
Regenerative medicine needs to cultivate the process of embryogenesis in 
such a way that it maintains its full spectrum of transformative possibilities. It 
requires a state of embryonic being that never grows up into this or that 
particular organism: a process of self-perpetuating, unactualized, and 
unfinishable embryogenesis. This is quite literally what biologists are 
attempting to accomplish when they culture and ‘immortalize’ an embryonic 
stem cell line. (2008: 127, emphasis original) 
Here again, the challenge is to reinterpret the agency specific to the living in terms 
of ‘work’ or ‘labor’, or as the title of an article that Cooper co-authored with 
Catherine Waldby puts it, ‘From reproductive work to regenerative labor: the 
female body and the stem cell industries’ (2010). The possibility of ‘culturing life’, 
to use Landecker’s expression (2007), does more than transform the conditions of 
production: it also changes systems of values.  
As early as 2008, Helmreich proposed a summary of works in the social 
sciences dedicated to the capitalist development corresponding to the value attached 
to the reproductive capacities of the living. Beyond the commodification of 
products or parts of the human body (Scheper-Hughes & Wacquant 2002), it is a 
question of their capacity to engender new forms of wealth. According to Cooper, 
there is thus an overlap between reproductive medicine and neo-liberalism: both 
have the ability to continuously generate surplus. This capitalist logic does not only 
apply to the human body, but also to the natural resources exploited in 
‘bioprospecting’ (see Hayden 2003). Waldby and Robert Mitchell point out, 
however, that the proliferation of tissues that are preserved and circulated in 
complex systems of exchange cannot be reduced to the dynamic of 
commodification, nor even to the dichotomy between gift and economic exchange 
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(2006: 6). Kaushik Sunder Rajan reveals how the process of biocapital and the 
fluidity of wealth creation owe a great deal to the new dialectic between materiality 
and the abstraction of the living. He writes that:  
The difference now is that genomics allows the metaphor of life-as-information 
to become material reality that can be commodified. In other words, one does 
not just have to conceive of life as information: one can now represent life in 
informational terms that can be packaged, turned into a commodity, and sold 
as a database. (Sunder Rajan 2006: 15, emphasis original) 
Engineering the Living: Assemblages and Systems 
Humans have long shaped and disassembled living beings in order to extract 
various products from them; from a certain point of view, the development of 
biotechnology merely continues this trend by manipulating reproductive materials. 
However, as advances continue in this domain, we are right to wonder whether 
biotechnologies represent a change in nature rather than in degree. Thus, François 
Dagognet declares: ‘previously, humans worked on masses, polishing, scraping, 
dividing […] altering forms. Today, we touch substance. In other words, 
biotechnology is noumenological whereas traditional technology is phenomenalist’ 
(1990: 114). This is especially true now that human efforts go beyond 
disassembling the living and strive to reassemble and synthesize, something that the 
world of the imagination has long explored, for instance, in the narratives of the 
Golem or Frankenstein, which inquire into how an organism can be built and 
animated through technical assemblage. Metaphors that treat life as text or as a 
program lead to the idea—if only as a logical complement—that analytic operations 
lead to a recombination. This is understood as a re-writing or a re-programming, so 
that the idea of ‘making an organism’ (Keller 2002) is no longer unrealistic. The 
trend toward decoupling the materiality of vital processes from the more abstract 
treatment of information (Landecker 2007; Sunder Rajan 2006) changes the nature 
of interventions on the living, which come nearer and nearer to engineering, 
whether it is a matter of ‘tissue engineering’ (Waldby & Mitchell 2006) or cloning 
(Franklin 2007). But the trend is most manifest in synthetic biology. While Systems 
Biology uncovers the elements involved in vital processes, recent advances in 
synthetic biology suggest that in time it will be possible to make new living forms, 
just as synthetic chemistry has been able to create new chemical forms. 
Even if it is necessary to rigorously take many variables into account in 
order to correctly identify which are true innovations, as well as to distinguish 
between media discourse and the reality of advances and potentials, it appears that 
after the explorations of precursors such as Leduc and Loeb in the twentieth century 
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(Keller 2002), synthetic biology has reached a new stage. In determining the place 
of synthetic biology in the history of biology (Morange 2009), we must look at 
interdisciplinary collaborations in particular (Molyneux-Hodgson & Meyer 2009; 
Rabinow & Bennett 2012), in a domain that is anything but homogeneous, with its 
diversity of techniques, scales, and modalities of intervening on the living. Thus, 
Christophe Malaterre (2009) proposes distinguishing three types of synthetic 
biology: ‘engineering of genetic circuits, of entire genomes, or of organisms’. Anna 
Deplazes-Zemp (2012) distinguishes five approaches: bioengineering, in silico 
synthetic biology, synthetic genomics, protocell synthetic biology, and unnatural 
molecular biology. Toepfer (2016) lists eight types of artificialities grouped into 
two categories depending on whether the elements combined by a synthesis are 
living or not. I will not delve into these discussions, which would lead me far from 
my subject, but rather will review the (well-known) reasons why we refer to the 
category of engineering in the domain of synthetic biology.  
It is perhaps in the presentation of this field by MIT researchers working 
with Drew Endy (2005) that we can most clearly see the desire to create a 
relationship to the living that depends less on investigating vital processes and more 
on developing technical procedures that can compose their fragments. Through a 
triple operation of ‘standardization, decoupling, and abstraction’, their goal is to 
create a stock of ‘BioBricks’ for manipulating vital processes. BioBrick parts are 
DNA sequences that conform to a restriction-enzyme assembly standard. These 
building blocks are used to design and assemble larger synthetic biological circuits 
from individual parts and combinations of parts with defined functions, which 
would then be incorporated into living cells such as Escherichia coli cells to 
construct new biological systems. Examples of BioBrick parts include promoters, 
ribosomal binding sites (RBS), coding sequences, and terminators. 
This approach sees the manipulation of BioBricks as analogous to the 
creation of electronic circuits and information programming. It considers that in 
order to function, an assemblage needs to bring together different elements (parts, 
devices, and systems) according to hierarchical principles. Whereas the ‘biomedical 
mode of reproduction’ emphasizes the potential for reproducing biomaterials, 
synthetic biology announces a more standardized type of intervention, in which 
fragments become ‘tools’ (see Deplazes-Zemp 2012). BioBricks convey a dual 
conception of the living because they are materially conserved in refrigerators and 
can also circulate and be distributed like software programs that non-specialists can 
use. This desire to open the field of technologies of the living to non-scientists can 
be seen in the annual IGEM competition, in which interdisciplinary teams present 
projects (in ecology, medicine, etc.) that could benefit from using synthetic biology. 
The organizers of this conference defend a peer-to-peer sharing economy, in which 
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participants have to use the BioBricks made available by the community, while also 
sharing those they have developed themselves. However, we may note that this 
ideal is not inherent in synthetic biology. Another well-known figure in this domain, 
Craig Venter, represents a clearly more mercantile modality, with an approach that 
sometimes has thaumaturgic overtones. 
It is remarkable that, no matter which economic models the actors working 
in synthetic biology choose and what the actual results obtained may be, the 
question of making holds a central place in thought and discourse surrounding this 
practice. In ‘How a “drive to make” shapes synthetic biology’ (2013), Pablo 
Schyfter explains that the goal of synthetic biology, which is to ‘make things’ rather 
than to produce knowledge as pure sciences do, has organizational, methodological, 
epistemological, and ontological consequences. The ontological implications allow 
us to grasp the specificity of the underlying conceptions of life: ‘the things of living 
nature are constituted as ontologically equivalent to the inanimate materials 
employed by existing engineering fields: as usable substrates at the disposal of 
technology-making ventures’ (2013: 4). That, however, does not mean we should 
understand this conceptual change as a reduction or homogenization, for the term 
‘making’ refers not to a uniform activity but to a diversity of practices and methods. 
Schyfter specifies: 
The field’s internal divisions come not from divergent commitments to making, 
but rather from different uses to which that making is put and competing 
methods by which it is carried out. Paradoxically, making becomes both what 
defines synthetic biology’s boundaries and a ground for internal contests. (6) 
He therefore suggests that ‘making’7 and ‘engineering’ should not be treated as 
synonyms, since making refers to a wider range of actions than engineering in the 
strict sense. Drawing on the discussion begun by authors such as Evelyn Fox Keller 
(2002, 2009), Maureen A. O’Malley et al. (2008), and Sophia Roosth (2013), 
Schyfter proposes complicating our understanding of the articulation between 
making and knowing. He distinguishes ‘making to know’ from ‘knowing to make’: 
‘Each of these relationships is characterized by different end goals, types of 
construction and epistemic species’ (2013: 10). 
Consequently, the study of ‘life as a making’ must highlight the existing 
differences between various fields of practice as well as the heterogeneity within 
each of these fields. Although engineering pursues an ideal of standardization and 
																																								 																				
7	‘I	 employ	 the	 term	 “making”	 in	 its	 ordinary	 sense.	 That	 is,	 I	 understand	making	 to	 be	 broadly	
synonymous	 with	 creating,	 constructing,	 building	 and	 producing:	 it	 is	 the	 putting	 together,	
bringing-into-material-existence	of	something.	The	plainness	of	this	definition	does	little	to	convey	
the	 richness	 of	 its	 consequences	 for	 science	 and	 technology.	 Fields	 seeking	 to	 construct	 things	
differ	 in	 significant	ways	 from	 those	 intent	 on	other	 ends,	 such	 as	 developing	 knowledge	 claims	
and	furthering	understanding’	(Schyfter	2013:	2).	
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uniformization, like any technical activity, it functions only because of the constant 
combination of heterogeneous elements and actions. This is why we must not have 
too narrow a view of engineering; we must take into account the fact that along 
with acting on living beings or on fragments of them, engineering projects also aim 
to create artificial beings or environments. Although these do not display biological 
characteristics, they can be considered living if we understand life as the process of 
creating a relational system between beings.  
It is interesting to examine how the decomposition/recomposition pair 
operates in domains other than biotechnology—for example, in the fields of 
artificial life and robotics. It may seem surprising to compare these spheres of 
practices in which actions take place on the ‘real stuff’ of the living. Nevertheless, 
the works of Sherry Turkle (2011) and Dominique Lestel’s piece (2017) in this 
special issue demonstrate how interactions with artifacts, whether robotic 
individuals or artificial environments, are central to our way of existence. New 
technologies, even if they are not biotechnologies in the strict sense, thus participate 
in redefining the living, both through their efforts to imitate it and in the ways they 
deeply transform what it is to live. 
In Creation: life and how to make it (2003), Steve Grand recounts the 
development of Creatures, a game in which players create beings that develop 
within a digital environment, thus popularizing the idea that artificial life can 
replicate certain vital processes outside of organisms. Helmreich’s fascinating study 
Silicon second nature (1998) traces the specificity of these technologies that 
approach the question of the living not through the materiality of the phenomenon 
but rather through its capacity for self-organization. For experts in artificial life, the 
algorithms that cause forms to develop and ‘self-reproduce’ in artificial 
environments cast light on biological traits that can be imitated. The existence of 
this particular kind of life-form leads some to imagine, following Christopher 
Laughton, an entirely new way of doing biology: ‘They hope the creation of such 
life-forms can expand biology’s purview to include not just life-as-we-know-it but 
also life-as-it-could-be—life as it might exist in other materials or elsewhere in the 
universe’ (1998: 8). In this context, the contribution of an anthropological 
investigation would be to show that ‘Artificial Life scientists’ computational 
models of “possible biologies” are powerfully inflected by their cultural 
conceptions’ (Helmreich 1998: 11). Thus there are not parallel universes but rather 
an essential connection between the virtual and the real (or the digital and the real), 
one that ought to be analyzed to open a space for contextualizing and comparing 
understandings of the living. But above all, as in artisanal activity, there is a co-
dependence between techniques for intervening on the living—in the present 
example, the programming that causes artificial life-forms to emerge—and the 
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epistemological categories created to think about the phenomenon of life. 
Helmreich states: 
An object or process like ‘life’ does not exist ‘out there’, waiting for us to name 
it […] This book, though centered on the human agencies enlisted in the 
making of Artificial Life, tries to get at how new notions of life are being 
materialized, specifically, at how life is being crafted to inhabit both the natural 
and the artificial—a process that is already transforming our meanings of 
nature, evolution, and life. (1998: 22) 
Though it is possible to see artificial life as an imitation, the most stimulating 
theoretical objective consists in going beyond the living being/artifact dichotomy 
and categorizing the diverse modes of connection between conceptual development 
and the creation of artifacts. 
The same is true in the domain of robotics, which attempts to create animate 
artifacts that have cognitive and physical functions similar to those of living beings. 
In Humanoïdes: Expérimentations croisées entre sciences et art (2015), Joffrey 
Becker portrays the creations of such artifacts by using a model of the living that is 
broken down into its functional elements and then (re)assembled. Analyses of 
physical movements and perceptive abilities must be translated into a programming 
language and a mechanical layout to ensure the robots have relative autonomy. The 
imitation of life goes beyond the materiality of bodies and involves a team effort to 
reproduce cognitive operations in robots. The hardware/software dichotomy 
appears as an ultimate variation of the opposition between a body engaged in 
physical movements and a mind tasked with handling information. Thus, there is 
imitation not just of organisms but also of the capacity to model ecosystems. The 
objective here is to create the most sophisticated loops possible between perception 
and reaction so that robots will succeed in moving and interacting fluidly in an 
environment. 
Digital artificial life creates an interactive and evolving dynamic that 
encourages the diversification of life forms within a relatively uniform universe that 
depends on a common programming language. On the other hand, in robotics, the 
challenge is to integrate the dissimilar and the heterogeneous in ways that lead to 
the emergence of quasi-persons (Dufrène, Grimaud, Taylor-Descola & Vidal 2016). 
Along the same lines, Becker follows the works of Grimaud and Vidal by 
highlighting the human tendency to attribute intentionality to even the most 
rudimentary artifacts. For the moment, the rigidity of human creations still seems to 
sharply demarcate them from biological beings, which are precisely characterized 
by their ability to combine the rigidity of certain parts with the elasticity of others. 
In sum, it is the ‘tensegrity’ specific to life that human technologies still have not 
managed to create, even though ever-finer integration of physical mechanics, 
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cognitive operations, and processes remains a goal. From a certain point of view, 
humans’ intentions here remain similar to those that led to the invention of the 
‘defecating duck’ by Vaucanson, who was also trying to create a living mechanism. 
In her analysis of this invention and, more broadly, of human attempts to imitate the 
living, Jessica Riskin (2003) demonstrates a sort of oscillation in human thought 
regarding such enterprises. She notes that through the ages, any progress made 
toward better knowledge of life, and thus toward a better imitation of it, has always 
been accompanied by the observation that humans are powerless in the face of the 
complexity of the phenomenon of life, which is ultimately acknowledged to be 
inimitable. 
It is possible that (bio)technical innovations are in the process of refuting 
this persistent observation. In any case, that is what certain discourses of bio-
engineering of the living seem to promise, in particular, in order to affirm that 
various technologies are now converging. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to imagine an 
intersection between engineering, which manipulates vital processes in an attempt 
to recombine biological elements at a microscopic level (here we may think of the 
possibilities contained in CRISPR/Cas9), and robotics, which imitates these 
processes at a more human scale. Whether we are thinking of micro-robots inserted 
into bodies to help with physiological functions, or of living elements being 
inserted into artifacts, it is clear that these intersections are many and lie at many 
levels. This is certainly the case when we consider that information technology is 
an increasingly effective interface for acting on the living. That is why, as Casper 
Bruun Jensen and Anders Blok (2013) suggest in their work on ‘techno-animism’ in 
Japan, we must develop an ecological approach. In addition to thinking of life as a 
multi-scale process, this approach should try to retrace the ontologies specific to 
certain cultures in order to detect how they understand relations between living 
beings and artifacts. Obviously, the future will tell how far the convergence 
between technique and ontological domains will go, and it will offer keys for 
evaluating which techniques can actually be put into practice. My goal is not to 
decide on this matter, but rather to show how the diversification of human technical 
activity causes new paradigms to emerge for thinking about and acting on the living. 
The fields of engineering I have discussed are all based on breaking down vital 
processes into material and informational elements, in order to perform a synthesis 
and attempt to create individuals or environments. However, this ideal of making 
corresponds to a diversity of practices and thus to a wide array of conceptions of 
the living. Serious study is required of the problems it raises, which cannot be 
solved by the dichotomy between living and artificial alone. Furthermore, the 
socio-economic systems in which these techniques flourish also vary greatly, so 
that we must look beyond the connections between biotechnology and capitalism 
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and take alternative positions into account. Whether in the domain of bioart or do-
it-yourself biology, we find practices that use technologies—sometimes the newest 
ones—and simultaneously hack them or call them into question. This, by the way, 
proves that a technique cannot be characterized solely on the basis of material 
procedures: the goals of those who practice it are also part of its identity. Now that 
we have seen how the engineering model tries to appropriate the efficacy of 
biotechnologies, I would like to look at a few attempts that contest this model: 
those of the artist and those of the tinkerer or bricoleur.  
Bioart and Tinkering [Bricolage]: From Poetics to Politics8 
The increase and diversification in forms of human mastery over the living raise 
serious questions, for they profoundly reshape many parts of existence. The 
appearance of new life forms requires us to rethink how agriculture, livestock 
raising, reproduction, and medicine, for example, are practiced and understood—in 
particular in order to invent adequate social relations to adapt to these innovations. 
As Helmreich writes: 
the relation between life forms and forms of life has become liquid, turbulent 
[…] Like the gene [...] life is being redistributed into a fluid set of relations. Life 
is strange, pushed into its conceptual limits, spilling across scales and 
substrates, becoming other, even alien to itself. (2009: 8)  
In order to handle the ethical, political, and economic problems raised by advances 
in biotechnologies, many countries have created committees of experts to set 
frameworks for research or to assign objectives to it. Indeed, it is necessary to 
deliberate not only on the design that presides over the making of an object—or 
bio-object—but also on the possible uses that might be made of it, including ones 
that should be forbidden. In short, it is necessary to evaluate a technique not only 
with respect to its purposes but also to the goals that societies decide to pursue. In 
parallel to this kind of framing, which takes place by deepening our knowledge of 
the potential of biotechnologies, whether positive or negative, bioart and do-it-
yourself biology contribute to this collective reflection, though in a different 
register. In both domains, making and human inventiveness are highlighted and on 
display. One of the objectives is to maximize awareness of the radical changes and 
possible dangers that result from biotechnological innovations. This opening to the 
public takes place through dialogue performed by exhibitions and sometimes 
through confrontation with the sciences and practices of individuals, who 
themselves become makers or hackers capable of acting on vital processes in their 
																																								 																				
8	This	expression	is	used	by	Morgan	Meyer	(2014)	in	the	title	of	the	piece,	‘Hacking	life?	The	politics	
and	poetics	of	DIY	biology’.	
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bodies or environments. Bioart sheds particular light on certain characteristics of 
the living, to which I will now turn. 
It is common to distinguish between art and technique by saying that the 
former has a less utilitarian relationship to creation. However, bioart’s use of 
various biotechnologies—both old and new—to act on the living justifies its 
inclusion in the present discussion. In Green light: toward an art of evolution 
(2010), bioartist George Gessert reminds us that acting on living organisms for 
aesthetic ends is nothing new—as attested by the creation of species of companion 
animals or the development of ornamental flower art. He writes, ‘In the light of 
biotech art, many domesticates can be understood as bio folk art’ (xx). The 
effectiveness of these configurations is based on the semiotic dynamic of living 
beings, who both perceive and are perceived. Thus, Eduardo Kohn (2013: 75) 
declares that ‘life is a sign process’, by which he means that each living being 
adapts to the signs emitted by other living beings, as well as to the way in which 
itself is perceived, and that these habits are transmitted from generation to 
generation. Without necessarily following him as far as this last point, which 
remains highly speculative, we may agree that the diversity of life forms that 
populate the world appear in the multitude of sounds, colors, images, flavors, and 
textures that are associated with them. Whether in hunting (Ingold 2000), fishing 
(Sautchuk 2012), or agricultural and horticultural activities (Malinowski 1935), it is 
clear that every human technique involving the living includes—at a minimum—a 
semiotic dynamic, and even an aesthetic evaluation. In the plant and animal worlds, 
the combination of these signs is one of the principle means by which beings 
interact. The ability of certain animals to modulate their songs and colors or to 
utilize elements of their environment to make objects—for example, in the nuptial 
parades of certain birds—even suggests that there are bodily and material animal 
techniques that allow these beings to influence their environment. Jean-Louis 
Schaeffer (2007) even proposes seeing these practices as the matrix out of which 
human aesthetic activity emerges.  
 In parallel with artistic practices that involve working on inert materials in 
order to create a perceptible effect—and even to imitate living beings—humans 
have long developed aesthetic practices that incorporate vital processes. Outside of 
the living arts (dance, singing, and theatre), which, in fact, mobilize the body as a 
means of expression, other life forms may also be used to produce aesthetic 
satisfaction. It is first and foremost the malleability of vital processes (whether on 
the level of the individual or that of the lineage) due to selective breeding or 
cloning that offers humans the pleasure of seeing the effects of their actions on 
organisms. But the fact that the effects of these processes are somewhat 
unpredictable also seems to be an attraction. It is as if the pleasing play between 
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control and uncertainty, between the creator’s intention and the development of the 
work, were reinforced in these configurations precisely by the presence of beings 
that have their own agency. Finally, in addition to their value as qualisigns, living 
beings and their fragments may act as signifying elements, as we see in the highly 
symbolic practice of garden art, for example. In short, by using the semiotic 
potential of the living, humans play with various aspects of the phenomenon of life: 
its plasticity, its capacity to evolve and to vary, as well as its connectivity. It is not 
just the power of formation or shaping of an organism that is at stake but the fact 
that its fragments can be re-connected to other elements, living or artifactual, in 
order to create an aesthetic effect or even a narrative or symbolic discourse. 
Today, this practice of combining heterogeneous elements, mixing living 
materials with expressive materials created using more or less ancient techniques 
(drawing, sculpting, poetry, photography, video, etc.), constitutes one of the 
characteristic traits of bioart, which has become a domain of its own within the art 
world. In 1936, the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York brought living 
beings into the museum space in the form of the floral composition Delphiniums, 
by Edward Steichen. For the past thirty years, this field has been growing,9 and 
works in which artists use cell cultures, genetic programming, or IPS (induced 
pluripotent cells) are exhibited in some of the world’s best museums. Bioart 
projects, whether connected to university institutions such as the Symbiotica lab at 
the University of Western Australia, led by the artists Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr, to 
art schools such as Suzanne Anker’s Bio Art Lab at the New York School of Visual 
Arts, or to the do-it-yourself biology network, are always based on collaboration 
between scientists and artists—or at the least, on a commitment to 
interdisciplinarity. In addition to the plurality of institutional contexts, the variety of 
technologies used to manipulate the living proves that a work’s aesthetic dimension 
lies less in its technical characteristics and more in the spirit that presides over its 
creation and in its strong performative value. By bringing new types of beings into 
existence, artistic processes demonstrate human inventiveness, which is increased 
by the fact that it often brings out new potentialities in living beings. 
 In order to grasp the variety of relations with the living in this domain, 
Gessert created a chart entitled ‘Organisms in Bio Art’ (2010: Appendix I), which 
lists the living beings and biomaterials contemporary artists have used in their 
works—and they total about a hundred. Insects, mammals, plants, fish, trees, 
grasses, mushrooms, and bacteria: the list of life forms mobilized in these projects 
seems to grow constantly. This is especially true because acting at the level of 
genes and cells (human or animals) offers artists—such as Eduardo Kac, Joe Davis, 
																																								 																				
9	See,	 for	example,	 the	edited	volumes	Signs	of	 life	 (Kac	2007)	and	Meta-Life	 (Bureaud,	Malina	&	
Whiteley	2014).	
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or Gessert himself—unprecedented possibilities for decomposition 
/recomposition: there seems to be an astonishing, teeming bestiary in which hybrid 
beings make a mockery of the classic concepts usually used to think about the 
living. In contrast to engineering, which usually employs problem-solving 
procedures, art, and a fortiori bioart, when successful, creates hitherto unknown 
objects and relations that raise new problems. This is true of the works created 
within the framework of the Tissue Culture and Art Project. For example, The 
Victimless Leather project grows ‘living tissue into a leather-like material’. The 
work ‘is grown from immortalised cell lines which are cultured and form a living 
layer of tissue supported by a biodegradable polymer matrix in the form of a 
miniature stitch-less coat-like shape’ (The Tissue Culture and Art Project n.d.). 
These ephemeral living works, whose ontological status is uncertain, along with 
these ‘semi-living’ beings, are presented to the public by means of ‘extended bodies’ 
and compel us to wonder about the possibility of separating vital processes from 
organisms. Along similar lines, Guy Ben-Ary’s work explores the paths of 
convergence between living beings and artifacts. This is for instance the case in 
Cellf, an installation that connects a network of neurons obtained from the artist’s 
cells using iPSC technology to a synthesizer that produces sounds and can interact 
with musicians (2015). Kac’s work in the field he has named ‘transgenic art’ (2016) 
foregrounds the issue of hybridization and the genetic proximity of kingdoms of 
living beings, in particular in works such as ‘Edunia’ (humans/plants) and ‘Alba’ 
(rabbit/jellyfish).  
The more or less explicit desire to cause surprise and provoke discussion 
shows that beyond poetics, there is a political aspect to the work of artists who use 
living beings in their pieces (Meyer 2014). The book Tactical biopolitics: Art, 
activisim, and technoscience by Beatriz da Costa and Kavia Philip (2008) offers a 
good overview of this aspect. Taking their cue from Michel de Certeau’s analysis of 
means of appropriating and deflecting [détourner] the elements of modernity 
(1984), they show a new aspect of technique. In addition to the material processes 
(artisanaland biotechnological) that artists use, their strategies are also techniques, 
just as poaching techniques arose in the shadow of hunting techniques. By paying 
attention to the sociopolitical consequences of biotechnological innovations, the 
goal is to create spaces for debate or, at the least, alternative paths that encourage 
critical reflection on emerging practices. This is the goal, for example, of the 
Critical Art Ensemble in developing a ‘contestational biology’ and ‘bioresistance’ 
(see Critical Art Ensemble 2002). 
We should not, however, conclude that the critical enterprise seeks only to 
propose alternative uses for molecular biology. Within the field of bioart, various 
ways of thinking about the manipulation of the living art are defended or, on the 
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contrary, criticized, so that debates take place within the field itself in order to 
prevent one type of technique from appropriating the discourse on the living. Thus, 
Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr praise ‘wet biology’: in contrast to the feeling of power 
that may result from treating life as an informational process in transgenic art, here 
the emphasis is on the materiality of vital processes and the uncertainty that 
surrounds them. Thus the authors explain that ‘the narratives we would like to 
question with our “wet hands” are the narratives of life as a coded program—
“biology as information”—and the way it serves the ideology and rhetoric of 
Western society advancing toward a false perception of total control over life and a 
technologically mediated victimless utopia’ (Catts & Zurr 2008: 126).10 Hence, cell 
culture appears as an alternative model within a space of contestation that presents 
the Maker not with the vertigo of a demiurgic power over biomaterials but rather 
with a more humble reflection on the essential uncertainty that accompanies the 
manipulation of vital processes. Above all, it implies another way of thinking 
decomposition and recomposition. Without denying the importance of molecular 
biology, the authors declare that:  
We would prefer to relate regenerative medicine to fragmenting, mixing, and 
reconstituting life. For example, fragmenting can be seen as isolating cells or 
tissues; mixing involves culturing/co-culturing; and reconstitution refers to 
embodying the result either in a new host body or in a new kind of ‘body’ or 
vessel (bioreactor/technoscientific body). (136) 
Finally, rather than fetishizing DNA, these authors favor a ‘multi-scale’ approach 
that focuses on how vital processes are integrated into various levels of 
organization, from the cell to the environment by way of the organism. 
Clearly, it would be wrong to claim that all bioartists are critical of some or 
all biotechnologies. A detailed study could catalogue the wide array of discourses 
developed by artistic creators and the variety of strategies they use, which range 
from fascinated usage of the potentials unleashed by new materials to frank 
opposition, for example, to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Rather than 
carrying out this analysis, I will pursue my initial cartography of the relationship 
between technical activities and conceptions of the living by focusing on the 
domain of ‘do-it-yourself biology’, where both critical approaches and alternative 
scenarios are put forward. While engineering defends an ideal of mastery and 
																																								 																				
10	‘As	 some	 of	 the	 current	 major	 developments	 in	 the	 life	 sciences	 are	 concerned	 with	 cell	
development	(rather	than	only	genetics),	it	is	worthwhile	to	look	at	cell	theory	and	tissue	culture	at	
the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century.	These	theories	are	concerned	with	the	materiality	of	‘life’	
and	the	environment	in	which	it	is	grown.	Rather	than	on	code,	there	is	an	emphasis	on	communal	
interrelationships	 as	 a	 reference	 point’	 (Catts	 &	 Zurr	 2008:	 137).	 ‘Working	 in	 laboratories	 with	
living	materials,	we	were	 faced	with	 the	 complexity	 of	 life	 in	 its	multi-levels.	How	 living	 entities	
(whether	 genes,	 cells,	 organs,	 organisms,	 or	 populations)	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 their	
environmental	factors,	and	are	always	in	flux’	(138).	
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efficiency—an object’s purpose should determine the means used to make it—the 
celebration of human inventiveness and bricolage generally seems to go along with 
respect for, or at least vigilant attention toward, that which in the living constitutes 
a type of autonomy that resists total comprehension and mastery [arraisonnement]. 
As the name suggests, do-it-yourself biology promotes a relationship to the 
living by non-scientists who appropriate the techniques usually reserved for 
professional scientists (Landrain, Meyer, Perez & Sussan 2013; Roosth 2010) for a 
wide variety of projects that attest to the hodgepodge of principles and plans that 
make up this domain. As Morgan Meyer (2012a, 2012b) tells us, the experiments 
performed may involve the authors extracting their own DNA and testing for 
genetic diseases or devising tests to determine the provenance of certain food items, 
or, more playfully, finding ways to produce fluorescent yogurt. Meyer uses the 
notion of tinkering (bricolage) to describe this diversity; the concept illuminates 
several aspects of DIYbio. The diversity of projects is linked to a process that gives 
more room to free exploration and to the simple pleasures of experimenting, doing, 
trying than engineering does. In ‘DIYbio: Making things and making futures’, 
Anna Delgado (2013) states that one of the characteristic traits of DIYbio is that it 
‘produces things rather than techno-objects’ (65). Specifying that ‘tinkering is 
learning by doing’, she adds that ‘DIYbio hackers appear as “bricoleurs” in the 
sense of Lévi-Strauss: assembling heterogeneous elements together, but not 
necessarily following a strict plan or a method’ (69). Bricolage also involves 
making objects to manipulate the living. Here too, inventiveness is the rule and 
objects are diverted [détourné] from their initial functions (for example, a PCR is 
created using a drill). Meyer declares that ‘The mutability of objects is also 
extremely important. Ordinary objects and modest resources can be transformed 
into scientific tools’ (2012a: 319). Alongside this engagement with material, which 
promotes an individual, concrete, and active relationship to biomaterials as well as 
to the tools used to act on them, DIYbio also implies a special relationship to 
knowledge. As with biocapital, DIYbio is based on a kind of decoupling of 
materiality and information. However, it is used in radically different ways for very 
different ends. The Biohacking movement (Delfanti 2013) defends the values of 
transfers and open science. 
The valorization of tinkering goes further than simply promoting know-how 
and knowledge sharing: it is connected to an original understanding of the living. 
While sharing with craftsmanship and engineering the idea that living beings and 
vital processes can be thought of as assemblages of elements that can be re-
composed, bricolage introduces a critical distance from the notions of function and 
finality. The inventiveness that goes into bricolage is such that similar functions can 
be obtained with different objects while, conversely, a single object may have 
	
P.	Pitrou.	Life	as	a	Making	
29	
NatureCulture	2017	
Copyright	owned	by	the	authors	
various functions, so much so that a pre-existing design or goal for fabricating an 
object is not essential to technical processes. This is an especially interesting point 
because bricolage is not merely a way of acting on the living, as the other 
techniques discussed in this article are: it is also a metaphor for thinking certain 
characteristics of the vital process as such. Thus, in Evolution and tinkering (1977), 
François Jacob explains how, from a certain point of view, the evolution of living 
beings can be conceptualized by analogy with this human practice. After having 
reminded readers that the results of evolution are far from perfect—as the 
extinction of hundreds of millions of species proves—Jacob suggests that: 
[tinkering] has several aspects in common with the process of evolution. Often, 
without a well-defined project, the tinkerer gives his materials unexpected 
functions to produce a new object […] Similarly evolution makes a wing from a 
leg or a part of an ear from a piece of jaw. Naturally, this takes a long time. 
Evolution behaves like a tinkerer who, during eons upon eons, would slowly 
modify his work. (1977: 1164) 
Many examples of this process can be found in the animal world. For example, take 
the development of lungs out of the esophagus among vertebrates; ‘to make a lung 
with a piece of esophagus sounds very much like tinkering’, Jacob notes (1164). 
This example leads him to distinguish between tinkering and engineering: ‘Unlike 
engineers, tinkerers who tackle the same problem are likely to end up with different 
solutions’ (1164; see also Bardini 2011). We see this in the fact that eyes, which 
have appeared many times over the course of evolution, perform the function of 
photoreception using very different principles: pinholes, lenses, and multiple tubes. 
Jacob thus concludes, ‘Evolution does not produce novelties from scratch. It works 
on what already exists, either transforming a system to give it new functions or 
combining several systems to produce a more elaborate one’ (Jacob 1977: 1164).	
Conclusion: Technical Activity and the Ecology of Living Systems 
There is always some danger in using human analogies to conceptualize natural 
phenomena, as we see in the use of the idea of design by those who oppose 
evolutionary theories. In certain respects, mobilizing the figure of the tinkerer also 
risks anthropomorphizing vital processes. In actuality, things are more subtle, 
precisely because the absence of design for transforming beings through the 
composition of elements yields an immanent conceptualization. Life appears as a 
making that produces its effects without us having to hypothesize an intention or a 
plan that would organize a variety of processes over the extremely long term. 
Understood this way, connecting technique and life opens up onto another 
understanding of the real, within which the place of humans varies. It is true that in 
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most cases the technicist metaphor that understands life as technique tends to 
foreground scenarios in which human activity—or the activity of demiurges acting 
like humans—constitutes a referent for interpreting vital processes. But with the 
hypothesis of ‘evolutionary tinkering’ the order of relations is reversed, and human 
technique is seen as an extension of vital activity. This does not only mean that very 
similar morphogenetic dynamics lead to the hypothesis of continuity or co-
evolution between living beings and artifacts, as Ingold’s phenomenology (2011) 
and André Leroi-Gourhan’s materialist theories (1943) suggest. It also means that 
life as such is a process of decomposition and recomposition that allows 
heterogeneous elements to be assembled into extremely diverse configurations that 
evolve over time, without any pre-existing order of implementation organizing a 
sequential chain. 
Thus, by maintaining that it is relevant to describe the ‘agentive 
configurations’ within which vital processes appear, I wish to emphasize the fact 
that in most cases it is instructive to describe in a single movement the actions of 
humans on living beings, the agency specific to these beings, and the modes of their 
co-ordination. However, this approach, with its emphasis on human practices and 
intentions, must not obscure the fact that at the same time all the non-human living 
beings also act on their environment as well as on humans. To be complete, an 
approach that sees life ‘as a making’ must therefore also attend to the ecological 
dimension of life in order to trace the dynamics at work independent of human 
activity and even, by reversing the order of causality, those that act on humans. 
Doing so is one of Ingold’s and Pálsson’s goals when they call for the development 
of an anthropology that can study ‘biosocial becomings’ (2013; see also Pitrou 
2015b). Ingold’s understanding of evolution seeks to reconceptualize the relation of 
organisms to their environment, a zone of interpenetration: ‘Within this zone, 
organisms grow to take on the form they do, incorporating into themselves the 
lifelines of other organisms as they do so. Every organism is a site of infestation, a 
vast ecosystem in itself’ (2013: 11). Against the idea of design, Ingold emphasizes 
the interactions between beings. Thus, human beings can be thought ‘in terms not 
of what they are but what they do’ (2013: 8, italics in original). But this does not 
mean that humans have a central position, as emphasized in Pálsson’s remarks 
concerning the concept of ‘milieu’ in Canguilhem: ‘The focus on milieu does not 
mean that the living organism has disappeared from sight, devoid of agency: on the 
contrary, the organism is the radiating center of pragmatic activity’ (qtd. in Ingold 
2013: 27). Similarly, in her chapter ‘Life-in-the-making: Epigenesis, biocultural 
environments and human becomings’, Eugenia Ramírez-Goicoechea emphasizes 
the importance of ‘action-in-relationality’ and reminds us how advances in 
epigenetics have led to the abandonment of the unilateral determinism sometimes 
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expressed in discussions of genes: ‘Gene-centered biology and its related 
disciplines do not consider the organism (or any other unit) as a co-building agent 
of its surroundings but rather as a passive recipient of evolutionary forces’ (2013: 
69). In contrast, ‘the concept of niche construction captures this complex 
autopoietic process of action in evolution’ (71). 
Stating that anthropology benefits from treating ‘life as a making’ thus does 
not mean privileging an anthropocentric approach that would see in old and new 
biotechnologies the mark of the human ability to extract themselves from biological 
laws. The growth of biotechnology is stupefying and certain promises for the future 
provide glimpses of radical breaks—for example, not merely domesticating the 
living but fabricating it ‘from scratch’. However, it is also possible to put technical 
activity into a broader framework, by taking into account the fact that life as such 
did not wait for humans before carrying out operations of combination and shaping 
that take place at multiple levels. Even if the growing variety and efficacy of human 
techniques does assuredly constitute something new within evolutionary tinkering, 
we must also note that such a movement did not come out of nowhere and that in 
many respects, all living beings make their environments (see Latour’s analysis 
(2015) of Lovelock’s and Margullis’s theories). In short, approaching life as a 
making only makes sense if human agency is understood in relation to non-human 
agency. It was precisely in order to carry out this descriptive and analytic project 
that I created the conception of ‘agentive configuration’. Although in most cases it 
is used to examine how human actions are carried out to control or influence living 
beings, it can also be used to study how other living beingscontinuously participate 
in constructing environments—including within themselves—and setting the co-
ordinates of human existence. 
My goal in this article has been to begin to explore the diversity of 
techniques that humans have developed to act on the living, as well as to 
understand the specific characteristics of the vital processes associated with this 
diversity. The domains of crafting, modes of (re)production, selective breeding, 
technology, engineering, tinkering, and art all represent agentive configurations that 
involve specific relations to the living. In truth, this is above all a heuristic and 
methodological distinction. In fact, it seems that these domains themselves refer to 
very heterogeneous techniques, while similar techniques are sometimes used in 
very different projects. In any case, certain techniques—cognitive techniques, 
techniques of the body—seem to be present in all these domains. The goal of 
studying this matter will be to propose a systematic articulation of these interplays 
of difference and similarity. To carry out such an undertaking, the anthropology of 
life can only obtain convincing results by being in constant dialogue with the 
anthropology of techniques. 
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